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REPORT 
NATIONAL WAR COMMITTEE 

OF THE 

CITIZEN^S OF NEW-T^ORIi, 

ON 

l^rmii (Organisation anlr gtpt Camp* 



The committee, appointed on the 22d inst., to draft a 
plan for a uniform depot system throughout the loyal States, 
by which the regiments now in the field and being raised may 
be kept full to their maximum standard, and to suggest such 
alterations in the organization of the volunteer forces as may 
increase their efficiency, and reduce the large and unnecessary 
expenditure incurred under the present inharmonious and 
unwieldy system, respectfully report — 

That it was clearly the intention of the framers of the Con- 
stitution to give full power to Congress to provide for the 
common defence, and that, in the language of the Federalist, 
" there can be no limitation of that authority, which is, to 
provide for the defence and protection of the community in 
any matter essential to its efficacy ; that is, in any matter 
essential to the formation, direction or support of the 

NATIONAL FORCES." 

" If we are earnest," says Hamilton, " about giving the 
Union energy and duration, we must abandon the vain pro- 
ject of legislating upon the States in their collective capaci- 
ties ; we must extend the laws of the Federal government to 
the individual citizens of America ; we must discard the fal- 



lacions scheme of quotas and recpisitions as equally imprac- 
ticable and unjust." 

The Constitution itself is clear and explicit in the authority 
which it grants to Congress. Among its enumerated powers 
we find specified — 

13. To raise and equip armies. 

15. To make rules for the government and regulation of 
the land and naval forces. 

16. To provide for calling forth the militia, to execute the 
laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasion. 

17. To provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the 
militia, and for governing such part of them as may be en- 
gaged in the service of the United States, reserving to the 
States respectively the appointment of the officers, and the 
authority of training the militia according to the discipline 
prescribed by Congress. 

At the time of the formation of the Constitution there were 
militia laws in existence in all the States, and the articles of 
Confederation had provided, " that every State shall always 
keep up a well regulated and disciplined militia, sufficiently 
armed and accoutred," &c. 

On the militia, therefore, and on the militia alone, the 
founders of the Constitution relied to provide for the common 
defence in the hour of j)ublic danger. 

The first care of our first military President, Washington, 
was to recommend a uniform system of organization for the 
militia in all the States. 

The militia must not be confounded with the volunteer. 
Etymologists agree on the definition of the term. Militia, 
Webster defines to be, " the body of soldiers in a State, enrolled 
for discipline, but not engaged in actual service, excej^t in 
emergencies, as distinguished from regular troops, w'hose sole 
occupation is war or military service. The militia of a coun- 
try are the able-bodied men organized into companies, reo-i- 



s 

ments and brigades, ■vi'ith officers of all grades, and required 
by law to attend military exercises on certain days only, but 
at other times left to pursue their usual occupations. In Eng- 
land the militia consists of 200,000 men, who do service about 
twenty-eight days in the year. In the United States the 
militia are composed of persons between eighteen and forty- 
five years." 

Worcester gives a nearly similar, though not so extended a 
definition : " A body of citizens regularly enrolled and trained 
to military exercises, but not permanently organized in time 
of peace, or in general liable to serve out of the countr}^ in 
time of war. The enrolled soldiers of a nation, as distinct 
from a standing army — the train bands. The militia of Eng- 
land and Scotland now consists of a certain number of men 
in every county, drawn by lot to serve for five years." 

The militia is to be considered a local institution, chiefly 
for home defence ; but for service in a wider field, in time 
of sudden danger or emergency. The appointment of its 
regimental officers was, therefore, wisely left to the States, 
and by these States the election of the company officers is, 
by most if not all of the constitutions, delegated to the men 
themselves. 

In order to insure efficiency and harmony when the na- 
tional defence should require their aid, the Constitution, how- 
ever, enjoined upon these States an accordance with the dis- 
cipline prescribed by Congress. 

The Act of 1792 provided fully for the organization of the 
militia of the respective States, to include all persons between 
the ages of 18 and 45 years, and that the said militia shall 
be officered by the several States, including division, brigade 
and regimental officers. 

The act of 1795 provides that it shall be lawful for the Presi- 
dent to call forth the militia of any State or States in certain 
cases ; and the use of militia so to be called forth may be 
continued, if necessary, until the expiration of thirty days 
after the commencement of the then next session of Congress. 

Again, the act says, no officer, non-commissioned officer or 
private of the militia, shall be compelled to serve more than 
three months after his arrival at the place of rendezvous, in 
any one year. 



This provision again clearly shows that the militia was not 
intended by Congress to be used as a defence against long con- 
tinued hostilities, but rather as a provision against sudden 
emergencies, and to encourage a military spirit in the people, 
and accustom them to discipline and the use of arms. 

These acts are not quoted as the whole of congressional legis- 
lation on this subject, but to show how early in the history 
of the government the plain intention of the Constitution was 
departed from. 

The outbreak of the rebellion found the States totally un- 
prepared for a great warlike struggle ; the system, in the 
form which the Constitution contemplated, would have, per- 
haps, sufficed fo^ an early destruction of all armed force op- 
posed to the gm^ernment, but neglected in almost all the 
States, and crippled in all by Congressional legislation, it 
proved totally inadequate to the emergency. 

An immediate call was made, therefore, by the President, 
for '^'unteers. And here, in the opinion of the committee, 
the .government, in not calling for men and officering them 
froip.-^he old army, took the tirst step in the path which has 
led to so much trouble, and has reduced the army to a con- 
ditiofTso discreditable to the United States, and to most, if 
not all of the separate States. 

To such an extent has the abuse of the authority, thus 
yielded by the general government, been carried, that it is 
already claimed tl^t the general government has not even 
the right to make a draft to fill up the regiments in the field, 
nor to withdraw a man from any State, except as a member 
of a company, and with officers chosen by himself or com- 
missioned by the State authorities. Tlie States thus pre- 
sent the feature of neglect of the duty imposed upon them 
by the Constitution, that of keeping the militia organized 
and in effective training, (which includes educated officers ;) 
and when, owing to their culpable neglect, the general gov- 
ernment is compelled, in a crisis like the present, to call for 
volunteers^ they step forward and demand the right of ap- 
pointing officers to these volunteers into the service of the 
United States, as though they were parts of the State 
militia. 



}^x^ 



So mucli for the rights of the States to officer the militia 
of such States ; and of the United States to take full charge 
of the volunteers for the service of the United States. The 
States have been the agents of the United States, in placing 
in the field the volunteer regiments, but such agency gives 
them no authority for appointment of officers, if the general 
government choose to assume it. 

Organization. 

The disgraces, the defeats, the humiliations to which the 
government and people of the United States have been com- 
pelled to submit, are chiefly due to the want of a thorough 
military organization in our armies, and to the fact, that the 
rebels have adopted, in its main features, the best European 
plan. 

Frederick the Great, of Prussia, held all Europe at bay 
by a proper military system ; and JS'apoleon, with the armies 
of France wisely organized, overran and conquered Europe. 

In the opinion of your committee, no further regiments 
should be raised ; but those in the field and now authorized, 
should be henceforth kept filled to their maximum standard. 

"We have now in the field two armies, one of drilled 
and accomplished officers, but essentially without com- 
mands, few of the regiments in the field averaging over 
300 to 500 men. The other, an army o/ fresh, vigorous re- 
cruits, with officers who do not understand the first rudiments 
of war, either in the care of men in camp, or the handling of 
them in the field. Bright, intelligent men can acquire the 
drill, sufficient for most service, in a few weeks, but an officer 
cannot be expected to learn his business in as many months. 

If, by direct appeals to the officers, or by a strict military 
examination and dismissal of such of them as are not ready 
for duty, the old and new regiments could be consolidated, 
it would be, of course, extremely desirable. But though this 
plan is, by all means, most to be wished, and an adoption of 
it, by the rapid efficiency it would give our large army, would 
probably bring the war to an immediate close, so radical a 
measure is scarcely to be expected. 



But, hereafter, let it be understood, tliat there shall be no 
new regiments, no new officers ; that the old organizations 
be kept continually tilled ; and due promotions, the only re- 
ward the soldier has in this country, be made where merited. 

Dkatt. 

The French conscription, or drafts is the only effective and 
economical plan of carrying on a great war ; and it is by 
its adoption that tlie rebels, with a small population, com- 
pared with OUT own, and resources which bear no compari- 
son whatever, have been able to confront our advancing 
armies, at every point, with forces superior in number and 
discipline. 

The day that our volunteer regiments take the field they 
begin to decline. Men who should never have been admitted, 
under any proper medical examination, fall out of tlie ranks 
from sickness, or, loshig courage at their daily labor and 
hardship, desert the camp. The ignorance of the officers pro- 
motes the casualties and sickness, to whicli they are, in any 
case, subject, and in a long campaign they are decimated, 
yes, twice decimated, without a battle. Every month the 
regiment becomes weaker, and finally, from battle and neglect, 
brigades have not the effective- strength of regiments, regi- 
ments of battalions, or battalions of companies, of the full 
standard ; the army becomes an army of skeletons, the officer 
loses his pride as his command diminishes, and the soldiers 
become appalled and disheartened at the gradual wasting 
away of tlie gay -companies, which left their homes strong, 
vigorous and determined. 

To pursue the subject. The difficulties of the regimental, 
brigade, division and army corps commanders, and of the 
general-in-chief, are enhanced in direct ratio witli their rank. 

The regimental unit, which is the element and base of all 
military calculations of force, for war is but an application of 
force, so varies, that it is a matter of surprise that any effective 
combinations can be made at all. 

When regiments vary in numbers from one hundred and 
fifty to one thousand men, as they are old or new, brigades. 



% 

divisions and army corps, in the same ratio, their com- 
manders are constantly embarrassed. All idea of distances 
is lost, a-nd all calculations of force to hold and attack posi- 
tions become complicated, when the mind of the commander 
shonld be aided and left clear. It is a return to the lowest 
organization of barbarous tribes, and such a force does not 
deserve the name of an army. 

The tried officers have the smallest number of men ; the 
untried, the fresh and effective regiments. 

How different the plan adopted by the Southern leaders. 
They form no new regiments, but keep the old - organizations 
full by draft. Civilians are not placed in command* From 
the day their regiments take the field they increase in effec- 
tive strength, and improve in morale and discipline ; their 
officeVs daily acquire new experience ; as their ranks are 
thinned they arc filled up, and the new recruits, so sparsely 
added, quickly become veteran soldiers. 

They acquire self-dependence ; they need no miles of army 
wagons to carry their guns, knapsacks, or to aid the weary 
and foot-sore ; no streams of stragglers lag behind their mov- 
ing columns ; but all is order and discipline. 

To this is owing that magnificent discipline, which has no 
parallel since the days of Frederick and l^apoleon ; that 
discipline which led their unbroken and unswerving lines in 
repeated charges up to the very mouths of the cannon at 
Malvern,; and enabled them to make those rapid changes of 
front, which set at naught the best strategy of our generals at 
Gaines' Mill and Manassas. 

To this they owe their dashing raids, their terrible attacks 
in line or column, and their masterly retreats before a vic- 
torious and courageous army. 

Even on the last battle-field, in the valley of the Antietam, 
nothing saved- our armies but the superiority of force, the 
consciousness of a good cause, and the proud heroism of our 
soldiers. 

In our navy, where discipline is strict, and the men learn 
their duties, how different the results ! 

Our people, little versed in military affairs, seek in various 
directions for the causes of the discomfiture of the Union arms. 



8 

By some it is ascribed to differences in the cabinet on the 
conduct of the war, by others to the want of military ca- 
pacity in our generals ; a still larger class ascribe the pro- 
crastinations and defeats to a want of united feeling among the 
people. There may be political diiferences — there doubtless 
are — and it is to be regretted that, while the people are en- 
gaged in such a struggle for their government and their 
national unity, there should be such divisions. Yet the mate- 
rial forces have been given without stint — resources, compared 
with which those of the great Emperor were but beggarly, 
and armies of untold magnitude. No united country ever 
placed such resources at the command of a government 
before. The fault is not, then, in our divisions. 

The faults are not in the government, not in the people, 
not in the commanders. Faults there have been, but not vital 
faults. The fault is in the system, and by their more correct 
system the rebels hold all this strength at bay. 

Practically, the Union and the South have changed ground — 
the rebels, while proclaiming the theoretic principle of seces- 
sion as the corner-stone of their government, and announcing 
themselves as a confederation of independent States, have, in 
practice, formed a consolidated government, with almost a 
one-man despotism ; the loyal States, bound by strong fede- 
ral ties, and committed to a consolidated government, have, 
in fact, gradually slipped back to the old States rights theory, 
and governors demand the right to equip troops and raise 
them as they see fit, and officer them as best suits their own 
views. 

All this should be changed, and changed at once, and the 
rebellion will soon totter to its fall. 

The remedy is simjjle. Arm, equip and discipline the 
whole militia for home defence ; but commission no new 
officers, raise no new regiments, until those in the field are 
filled to their full strength. 

The general government should take possession of the en- 
rolment lists, and make an immediate draft to fill up the 
regiments. This is sadly needed. But three weeks since, the 
New- York regiments in the field lacked 53,000 men to com- 
plete them to the maximum standard ; Pennsylvania, 



30,000 — a reinforcement which, had it been made in July, 
would have given us Richmond in August, from whatsoever 
direction our generals saw fit to attack. 

If it is thought best to use the State authorities to this end, 
the general government may commission all the governors 
as major-generals of departments, or all the adjutant-generals 
of the several States, as assistant adjutant-generals of the 
United States, requiring reports, in either case, to the "War 
Department. 

A general order of the War Dej)artment will insure uniform 
action in all the States, and the draft can be made at once. 
If commitments have been made to commanding officers by 
the Governors, in cases of new regiments raising, a second 
draft can be made by the State officers to complete them. 
Thenceforth let no new regiment be raised ; the skeletons now 
exist for over 1,000 regiments, which filled, would number 
1,000,000 men. 

The economy of a system which keeps the regimental or- 
ganization always full is too evident to need more than a 
passing allusion. 

The number of men needed to complete the ranks of the 
old levies is at least 300,000. To command them, not a dol- 
lar of additional expense need to have been incurred ; but 
the plan adopted, of raising new regiments instead of recruit- 
ing the old, involves the appointment and pay of 1,800 field 
officers, colonels, lieutenant-colonels, majors, adjutants, quar- 
termasters and commissaries ; of 9,000 captains and lieutenants, 
not to mention the non-commissioned officers — an expense of 
millions — every dollar of which could have been avoided. 

Depots. 

Depots should be organized on the lines of rail-roads, to 
which the drafted men should be sent. These camps should 
combine the features of a central recruiting office and a camp 
of instruction. Here the volunteer should also be received ; 
and no distinction should be permitted between the drafted 
and the volunteers, to cause jealousy in the camp or in the 
field. Enough heart-burning has been caused already by the 

2 



10 

distinctions between regulars and volunteers, fomented, per- 
haps, in some cases, by thoughtless or ambitious men, in 
pride, ignorance or wickedness. 

These camps should be under the charge of a field officer, 
and the instruction of the men may be given by officers 
and sergeants whose wounds or health render them unfit for 
active service in the field. Mustering officers, medical ex- 
aminers and assistant quarter-masters and commissaries 
should be attached to each camp, and a clerk, to keep the 
records of the movements of the men. All these offices could 
be filled, without expense, by invalid soldiers. It was to these 
camps of instruction that France owed the armies which 
achieved triumphs over combined Europe. 

A central camp should be organized on the same princi- 
ple, in the chief city of each State, to the commanders of 
which all reports should be made. As men are drilled and 
ready for the field, in the interior camps, they should be for- 
warded to this central camp for transportation ; arrived there, 
the drafted men and the volunteers should be permitted to 
elect in what regiments they will serve, so long as such regi- 
ments are not filled. 

The whole expensive system of recruiting offices would be 
thus abolishedj and from this central office returns could be 
made out to tlie authorities of the State and general govern- 
ment. 

A system like this would present features far superior ta 
those of the depot battalions of Europe, which, needed for 
garrisons there, are unnecessary here, and regimental and bri- 
gade drills would rapidly educate a corps of non-commission- 
ed officers, the arm which strikes, as the line officer is the 
brain which thinks for his command. 

Bounty. 

The system of bounty, paid directly to the recruit, should 
cease at once. It is unjust that those who enlisted at the be- 
ginning of the war, many of whom left their families in dis- 
tress, under promises which have not, in all cases, been ful- 
filled, should not be as favorably treated as the raw recruit ; 



/ ^ 



11 

dissatisfaction is created among the old volunteers. The mo- 
ney so paid is too often lavishly wasted while the recruit 
lingers about the town or city waiting for the completion of 
his company. The allotment system is, after all, but a make 
shift to cure, in part, a radical evil. 

In lieu of a system of bounty, the French plan of exonera- 
tion should be" adopted. 

The United States or the State government should indicate 
a sum, say $500, which shall exonerate the drafted from mili- 
tary service. The sums thus obtained should be paid into 
a special fund, for the support of disabled soldiers. 

Men without military inclinations will not thus be forced 
into the ranks. The morbid feeling that it is discreditable to 
be drafted will be done away with, and the demoralizing 
system of trade in substitutions by brokers and insurers be 
broken up. 

Communities may apply the funds now given for bounties 
to a relief fund for the families of soldiers when indigent. 

It is estimated that 50 to 75 millions dollars have been 
paid in bounties by individuals, associations, coi-porations 
and State and J^ational legislatures. The principal of this 
sum, funded in United States securities, would have been a 
great aid to the government, and the interest of the fund 
would have been of equal service to the beneficiaries. 



The committee presents these suggestions as the result of 
much study and thought upon the sad errors which have so 
paralyzed the arm, and sickened the heart of the nation. 

They are actuated in their recommendations only by mo- 
tives of pure patriotism. They seek to serve no interests 
but those of the country and the cause. The main features 
have been discussed with some of the most intelligent of the 
military authorities of the neighboring States, and have re- 
ceived, in detail, the sanction and approbation of some of the 
first military authorities of the country. They are warmly 



12 : 

endorsed by foreign officers, well acquainted with the systems 
of Eui'ope. 

The committee believe they will meet the vie'#s of the 
War Department, and of many of the patriotic governors of 
the loyal States. 

If, in the least, they aid to the establishment of a military 
system more harmonious and correct^than the present wretch- 
ed plan of organization, the committee will have achieved the 
end they have in view, and the object for which they were 
raised by their patriotic and earnest constituents. 



John Austin Stevens, Jr 
William Oeton, 



i 



' ''V Conrniittee. 



New- York, September 23d, 1862. 







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